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Varon, Elizabeth R. Appomattox: Victory, Defeat, and Freedom at the End of
the Civil War. Oxford University Press, $27.95 ISBN 9780199751716
Placing an Important Event in the Proper Perspective
Professor Elizabeth Varon, who teaches at the University of Virginia, has
previously written Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War,
1789-1859; We Mean to be Counted: White Women and Politics in Antebellum
Virginia; and Southern Lady, Yankee Spy: The True Story of Elizabeth Van Lew,
a Union Agent in the Heart of the Confederacy. To this impressive list she has
now added the first full-scale analysis of the meaning of Confederate surrender,
before, during, and after the famous event at Wilmer McLean’s table. She treats
Appomattox as a major event in American history, worth extensive analysis, but
also as a very engaging human story, and so we get details down to the level of
souvenir-hunting: one of Phil Sheridan’s aides acquired a rag doll belonging to
McLean’s daughter, took it home, and named it “Silent Witness."
The Johnson-Crittenden Resolution of December 1861, denying that the war
was to abolish slavery, said in effect that southern surrender would mean
restoration of the Union and nothing more. The Emancipation Proclamation
significantly changed that view, and thus raised Confederate fears about the
meaning of defeat. Congressional adoption of the 13th Amendment just before
the surrender further confirmed that in Union eyes the Old South was gone for
good. Yet neither Union nor Confederate public opinion was uniform on the
purposes of the war, and Professor Varon carefully dissects the two populations
to reveal the extent of the divisions.
She is also very attentive to the views and actions of the enlisted men of
both armies. Union soldiers did not victimize their opponents. They shared food
and clothing with them and assisted them on their homeward journey.
Confederates for the most part observed their paroles and treasured their parole
certificates as proof that they had not deserted, but fought honorably to the end.
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And more than Confederate civilians, Lee’s soldiers trusted Grant’s motives and
intentions towards them.
The attitude of black soldiers and civilians is also highly instructive. Grant
had seven black regiments brought to Appomattox as an affirmation of the role
the United States Colored Troops had played in securing victory and freedom.
For years after the war, former slaves dated significant events in relation to
“Surrender Day." During the New Deal the government collected oral histories
from former slaves. One elderly woman proudly noted the dates of important
events and said, “You don’t know nuthin’ when you don’t know dates."
Surrender was a military act, the result of a chain of strategic and tactical
decisions. Thus, Professor Varon carefully narrates the Appomattox campaign of
April 1865. She pursues letters and diaries from both sides to establish how the
soldiers, prominent and forgotten, interpreted the meaning of surrender. Then
there is the repeated effort of Lee to get Grant to agree to a negotiated surrender
rather than an unconditional one. Here, issues of staging and protocol took on
high significance. In the end, it was all Grant’s show.
It should not be surprising that the meaning of Appomattox became
controversial immediately after the event. For Grant, the meaning was not just
preservation of the Union, but transformation of the Union into a nation of
freedom and respect for black Americans. The course of early Reconstruction
convinced Grant that the ballot was necessary to ensure freedom and protection
for blacks. Lee, on the other hand, insisted that the surrender was only that – a
military action made necessary by the “overwhelming numbers" his army faced.
Thus the army left the field with its honor fully intact and need not think of itself
as having been defeated.
Lee took the position that the surrender was a contract that also imposed
terms on the North – no revenge, no political reprisals, no war crimes trials – and
that if the North broke its word, resistance might resume. This position went
against advice from a chief subordinate, General Richard Ewell, but it became
popular in the South and in Copperhead circles in the North. Grant hoped that he
and Lee could show politicians how generals behaved with regard to issues of
state. But Lee was not in the mood, and Grant quickly got drawn into the
maelstrom over Johnson’s policies.
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Indeed, Lee became a polarizing figure throughout the country. Not at all
withdrawn, Lee made speeches, gave interviews, and corresponded with
prominent editors nationwide, including even some with Copperhead views,
much to Grant’s disgust. The two generals personified the opposing labels for
the postwar period. Lee favored “restoration" of the country to its postwar power
alignments with the South in its rightful position of leadership and its leaders
unpunished. Grant favored “reconstruction" of the country into a nation based on
freedom and equality.
The “squandered opportunity" theory of Reconstruction’s failure arose in
contemporary reaction to Andrew Johnson’s policies. Grant certainly accepted it.
And it has been a fixture in Reconstruction historiography since the 1960s. But
was there an effective tool with which to implement federal policy? Lee, with the
support of many southerners, insisted that the surrender terms were a “let us
alone" contract with the federal government which, if violated, would justify
resistance. Prominent Radicals favored long-term military occupation.
The use of force to effect political, social, and cultural change is still a
modern world issue. In 2009 the United States Naval War College organized its
Senior Course on civil government in post-combat environments. The case
studies, along with Iraq, were Germany and Japan 1945, Kosovo -- and
Reconstruction, because officers serving in Iraq often faced issues similar to
those their predecessors faced in the South. Untrained officers performed civil
functions because civil government often did not exist, especially in the early
years, or was unreliable. And what do surrender and defeat mean, long-term and
short-term, in the sectarian, guerilla wars of the present?
In this very excellent and thought-provoking volume, essentially a study in
military statesmanship, we follow the views and actions of the war’s two most
prominent soldiers. But we should not forget the views of a third, William T.
Sherman, who in September 1865 wrote to his brother: “No matter what change
we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people South, we cannot
accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain there an army large
enough to hold them in subjugation. All we can, or should attempt is to give
them rope, to develop in an honest way if possible, preserving in reserve enough
military power to check any excesses if they attempt any."
James E. Sefton has been Professor of History at California State 
University, Northridge, since 1965. His teaching fields are Civil War and
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Reconstruction, World War II, Naval History, and Constitutional History. He
has published The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877, and
Andrew Johnson and the Uses of Constitutional Power.
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